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Abstract
This paper studies the link between a rms education level, export performance
and wages of its workers. We argue that rms may escape intense competition in
international markets by using high skilled workers to di¤erentiate their products.
This story is consistent with our empirical results. Using a very rich matched worker-
rm longitudinal dataset we nd that rms with high export intensities pay higher
wages. However, an interaction term between export intensity and skill intensity has
a positive impact on wages and it absorbs the direct e¤ect of the export intensity.
That is, we nd an export wage premium, but it accrues to workers in rms with
high skill intensities.
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1 Introduction
There is a substantial empirical literature on wages in exporting rms. This literature was
initiated by Bernard and Jensen (1995) who found evidence for productivity and wage
premia in exporting rms. Since then there has been a large number of studies replicating
and extending their analysis, and by now it seems to be a stylized fact that exporting
rms are more productive and pay higher wages than non-exporting rms (see Schank,
Schnabel and Wagner (2006) for a recent list of existing studies).1 There are competing
theories as to why this is the case, but most support has been found for self-selection of
the most productive rms into exporting as the explanation (see e.g. Clerides et al. (1998)
and Bernard and Jensen (2004)). Hence, the standard explanation is that the superior
performance of exporting rms is due to unobserved heterogeneity.
In this paper, we consider whether the wage premium in exporting rms is linked to the
use of human capital in exporting rms. A distinguishing feature of exporting rms is that
they use more highly educated labour than non-exporting rms. This is what international
trade theory would suggest for countries that are relatively well endowed with educated
labour, and this is conrmed by existing studies (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1995)).
Therefore, one hypothesis is that the export premium in wages is actually an educated
labour premium. In recent papers by Barth (2002), Battu, Beleld and Sloane (2003) and
Martins (2004) evidence for the existence of human capital externalities at the work place
level is found, i.e., the wage level in rms using more educated labour increase beyond
the level explained by the individual educational attainment. Thus the exporting variable
may pick up such spillover e¤ects of education, if they are not properly accounted for in
the wage equation.
An alternative hypothesis we consider is that there is an export premium in wages,
but this premium interacts with the education level in rms. That is, the export wage
premium is higher in rms using more educated labour. The existence of a link between
the skill level, international trade and wages has been suggested by Schott (2004). He
documents that rms producing unskilled labour intensive goods are more likely to be in
direct competition with rms from low wage countries at international markets. Therefore,
a higher skill intensity in exporting rms may mitigate the e¤ect of competition from
low income countries, and, if there is rm specic wage bargaining, this lower level of
competition may turn into higher wages (see e.g. Dowrick (1989) and Slaughter (2001)).
This paper can be seen as combining the literature on the exporting wage premium
1With the exception of the analysis of Schank et al. (2006) this literature is almost solely based on
rm level data, so possible selection of high-ability workers into exporting rms is not taken account of.
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with insights from the literature on human capital externalities. The evidence on the exis-
tence of human capital externalities are mixed. For example Acemoglu and Angrist (2000)
nd no impact of average skill levels on average wages in US states, while Moretti (2004)
reports a signicant positive impact of the share of graduates in US cities on individual
worker wages. In the present context we are interested in human capital spillovers at the
rm level, and these may be particularly important because it is likely that individuals
interact more and learn more from each other at this level compared to the city or region
level. As mentioned a few papers have recently found evidence of positive externalities at
the rm level. Using a Norwegian panel data set of workers, Barth (2002) documents a
signicant e¤ect of rm average level of education, while using cross sectional data for the
UK Battu, Beleld and Sloane (2003) nd positive rm level external returns on individ-
ual wages. Martins (2004) uses a panel of Portuguese rms to also document substantial
social returns to rm level education.
We have access to a unique matched worker-rm panel data set with information
about rmsexport behaviour. Our empirical approach is to compare otherwise similar
individuals working in rms with di¤erent export intensities and shares of highly educated
workers in the workforce. In contrast to most of the literature on exporting wage premia,
our data set allows us to control for observed and unobserved individual characteristics,
such as ability, that are correlated with wages and the export status of rms. It is
likely that high-quality workers sort into exporting rms. For example exporting rms
may reward observed and unobserved ability better than non-exporting rms, causing
high-ability workers to select into exporting rms. In this case, the observed exporting
wage premium might simply be due to di¤erences in observed and unobserved worker
characteristics.
Our empirical analysis starts out by reestablishing results from the two literatures on
exporting wage premia and external returns to education. First, we conrm the nding by
Bernard and Jensen and others that exporting rms pay higher wages, although it is not
whether the rm exports but the export intensity that matters. This result is in line with
the only other study that uses matched worker-rm data (Schank el al. (2006)). Second,
we nd that not only is there a positive e¤ect of individual education on individual wages,
but there is also a considerable spillover e¤ect of education on other workers on top of
this private return. That is, we nd that a higher skill intensity in the rm has a positive
impact on wages of all workers in the rm. Third, we nd that rms who export more
also use more skilled labour, but this does not explain why there is a wage premium in
exporting rms. Finally, we show that the size of the export premium is increasing in the
skill intensity of the rm, as we nd that the inclusion of an interaction term between
2
the export intensity and the skill intensity enters the wage equation with a signicant
positive e¤ect. In addition, this interaction term absorbs all of the direct e¤ect of the
export intensity and part of the direct e¤ect of the the skill intensity of the rm. In other
words, we nd that there is an export premium, but it is increasing with the rm level
skill intensity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we o¤er
some theoretical considerations about the link between wages, education and international
trade. In section 3, we describe the data set. In section 4 we specify the empirical model
and present the estimation results. Finally, in section 5 we conclude.
2 Two alternative hypotheses
The point of departure of our paper is that wages are higher in exporting rms than in
non-exporting rms. The standard hypothesis in the literature is that this is a result of
the most productive rms self-selecting into being exporters. This self-selection process
may exist if there are xed costs of exporting, because it is only the most productive rms
who nd it protable to investin exporting (see e.g. Clerides et al (1998), Bernard and
Jensen (1999) and Melitz (2003)). A competing theory is that rms become more produc-
tive when entering foreign markets because of competition and learning in international
markets, see e.g. Clerides et al. (1998). However, only a few empirical studies nd that
this is actually the case (see e.g. Girma, Greenaway and Kneller (2004)).
Irrespective of whether the exporting wage premium is a result of self-selection or learn-
ing in export markets, the premium is not necessarily related to the rmsuse of human
capital. But this possibility is our focus, and we will consider two separate hypotheses in
relation to this issue.
2.1 Hypothesis 1
The rst hypothesis we propose is that the export premium found in empirical studies
reects a missing variable in the estimations, namely the human capital level in the
rms. Human capital intensive countries have a comparative advantage in human capital
intensive production, and so exporting rms  i.e., the rms that exploit comparative
advantages  employ more educated labour than non-exporting rms.2 Moreover, as
2Even in countries intensive in the supply of unskilled labour, it may be the case that exporting rms
use more skilled labour than non-exporting rms but less skilled labour than exporting rms in countries
intensive in skilled labour, see e.g. Feenstra and Hanson (1997).
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suggested by the results found in Barth (2002), Battu, Beleld and Sloane (2003) and
Martins (2004), there are human capital spill-overs inside companies. The idea is that
workers interact at the workplace and learn from each other, and this interaction e¤ect is
stronger the more high skilled workers there are. Notice that this human capital e¤ect is
in addition to the private return to education. Hence, according to this hypothesis, the
wage level is higher in exporting rms than in non-exporting rms, but this is a result of
exporting rms using more human capital than non-exporting rms.
2.2 Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis acknowledges the existence of an export premium in wages for
example due to the self-selection of the most productive rms into being exporters but
the size of the premium depends on the skill intensity in the rm. The foreign markets
a rm is able to serve may depend on the type of labour employed in the rm. A rm
producing clothes may for instance choose to produce a "standard" product. To do
this it mostly needs unskilled labour and machines. Alternatively the rm may produce
expensive design clothes and by doing so the rm may enter a market with product
di¤erentiation and a lower degree of competition. To enter such markets, the rm needs
to employ highly skilled labour to develop and brand the product. As documented in
Schott (2004), low wage countries mainly produce low priced (low quality) goods. Hence,
it seems likely that rms that choose the rst strategy and produce unskilled labour
intensive "standard" goods are more likely to compete with rms from low wage countries
in export markets. In contrast, rms who pick the second strategy and employ high skilled
labour may escape intense competition from low wage countries. Lower product market
competition, in turn, is likely to spill over into wages if the labour market is unionised
and workers and rms bargain over wages (see e.g. Dowrick (1989)). Also there is solid
empirical evidence showing that spill-overs from the product market to the labour market
exist, see e.g. Blanchower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996), Hildretch and Oswald (1997),
Slaughter (2001) and Arai (2003).
In addition, case studies of specic markets also o¤er support for the hypothesis that
by using more skilled labour a rm may better serve markets with less competition. One
example is Goldberg (1995) who nds that the demand elasticities for luxury and sports
cars are lower than those for other types of cars. Another example is Hausman, Leonard
and Zona (1994) who nd that the demand elasticity for premium beer is lower than that
for popular (standard) beer.
To sum up, our hypothesis is that if a rm produces a "standard good", there is in-
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tensive competition in international markets from low wage countries. Fierce competition
in turn puts downward presure on the prot margin of the rm as well as on wages.
By spending ressources on product di¤erentiation  i.e., employing more skilled labour
to undertake e.g. innovation, design or branding a rm may be able to sell goods in
international markets where the degree of competition is lower. That is, the rm may
sustain a higher prot margin, but workers also gain from a reduced competitive pressure
through higher wages. Hence, our second hypothesis is that, if there is a positive export
premium in wages, it should mainly be found in rms employing high-skilled labour i.e.,
there is a positive interaction e¤ect between exporting and the skill intensity in the rm
on wages.
3 Data
We have access to a very rich matched worker-rm longitudinal dataset covering the total
Danish population for the years 1999-2002 the socalled FIDA dataset which is based
on administrative registers. Each individual and each rm is associated with a unique
identier, and most importantly all employed individuals are linked with a rm identier
at the end of each year. Detailed information on individual socio economic characteristics
is available on an annual basis. These individual level variables are extracted from the
integrated database for labour market research (IDA) and the income registers in Statistics
Denmark, which have been used in numerous studies. For more details on the IDA dataset
see e.g. Abowd and Kramarz (1999).
To this matched worker rm dataset we have merged detailed records on international
trade for all rms from The Danish External Trade Statistics. The external trade statistics
are compiled in two systems; Intrastat (trade with EU countries) and Extrastat (trade
with non-EU countries), and the compilation follows internationally agreed principles for
statistics on international trade, see Statistics Denmark (2003) for further details. If a
rm exports a specic product to any given country in any given month, this is recorded
as one observation in the data. That is, for each combination of rm, month, destination
country and product code3 the total (fob) value of the transaction is known.
In addition to the trade variables there is information about total sales of the rm,
thus allowing us to calculate the export ratio of each rm in each year. Furthermore we
also construct a measure for the capital labour ratio of each rm as the value of land,
buildings, machines, equipment and inventory divided by the number of full-time workers,
3The product code is the socalled Combined Nomenclature which encompasses more than 10,000
di¤erent products.
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and (log of) the size of the rm in terms of the workforce is also included in the analysis as
a control variable. From the matched workers we also calculate the proportion of workers
with further education at the rm level.
We restrict attention to trade with countries outside the EU countries4 and Norway
for two reasons. First, data on intra-EU trade is censored in a way such that only rms
exporting goods with a total annual value exceeding a certain threshold5 are recorded in
the les. No such data limitations exist for trade out of the EU. Second, Denmark is a
small and very open economy in which a relatively large proportion of rms export. The
formation of the internal market in the EU during the 1990s has abolished most trade
impediments, and so the EU can increasingly be regarded as the domestic market for
Danish rms, and due to the small size of the Danish market a relatively large part of all
medium sized and large rms almost by denition must be exporters. By focussing on
trade with countries outside the EU we get more variation across rms, and such trade
better resemble that of rms in larger economies like the US.
Throughout the paper we only analyse rms (and their workers) with more than 50
employees, and there are several reasons for this. First, the small rms are much less
inclined to export. Second, the link between workers and the small rms is sometimes
incorrect or missing. Finally, the number of workers with further education employed in a
rm is in practice indivisible, and, therefore, in small rms our measure of skill-intensity
becomes very sensitive to the hiring or ring of a single educated worker. This implies that
our measure of skill-intensity would be very noisy in small rms. The resulting dataset
still covers the majority of workers in the manufacturing sector; almost 3/4 of all workers
are employed by rms with more than 50 employees.
A number of studies have documented substantial heterogeneity among rms within
industries with respect to their export behaviour, see Tybout (2003) for an overview. Far
from all rms export, and this is also true even for Danish manufacturing rms with more
than 50 employees, cf. Table 1. Around 85 percent export their products to countries
outside EU15 and Norway (88 percent in 2002). There is clearly a positive correlation
between rm size and the propensity to export; if all rms with more than 10 employees
had been included only approximately 55 percent would be counted as exporters using the
same export denition. Danish manufacturing rms sell around 18 percent to countries
outside EU15 and Norway. Had we included EU15 and Norway in the export denition
more than half of manufacturing production is exported. This, of course, reects the fact
4In our data period (1999-2002), the EU consists of: Germany, UK, France, Italy, Spain, Ireland,
Portugal, Belgium, Greece, Austria, The Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Sweden and Denmark.
5This threshold was in all four years of the sample period 2.5 mill. Danish Kroner corresponding to
335.000 Euro.
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that the EU countries are very important export destinations for Danish companies. For
comparison Bernard and Jensen (1995) report for US manufacturing rms in 1987 that 15
percent export, while for French manufacturing rms in 1986 Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2004) report that 17 percent export.6 These are much lower numbers and indicates the
inevitable negative correlation between domestic market size and export orientation. The
percentages exported for these two countries are 10 percent and 22 percent respectively.
This shows that by focussing on exports to countries outside EU and Norway the export
behaviour of rms is more comparable to that of rms in larger economies.
Insert Table 1 here
Table 2 displays sample means for nonexporters, exporters and exporters with an
export intensity exceeding 10 percent. Danish exporters are indeed larger, older and
use a higher share of workers with further education. Interestingly, rms that export a
relatively large proportion of their sales also have an even higher share of workers with
further education. In the empirical analysis in the following section, we use this share of
workers in the rm having a further education as our measure of the skill intensity in the
rm.
With respect to average wages, exporting rms in fact pay somewhat lower wages to
workers with a vocational education, but they pay more to workers with further education.
Thus the raw data suggests the existence of a link between exporting, wages and skill
intensity.
Insert table 2 here
Among the individual level variables the hourly wage rate is obviously the most im-
portant one in the analysis, and this wage rate is calculated as total labor income divided
by the total number of hours worked in any given year. A long list of individual socio
economic characteristics are used as control variables in the analysis. There are self ex-
planatory dummies for gender, the presence of children, the presence of two adults in
the household, immigrant status and city size. We also include standard human capital
variables, i.e., dummies for educational attainment, labour market experience, experience
squared and job tenure. In addition, there are dummies for membership of unemploy-
ment insurance funds and trade unions. We also include dummies for the occupation
and industry of the individual. Occupational dummies are based on the Danish version
of the ISCO-88 denition, and we operate with the nine main categories. The industry
6Bernard and Jensen (1995) exclude small US rms, while Eaton et al. (2004) include all French rms.
They both include exports to all foreign destinations.
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dummies are based on the three digit NACE level, which leaves us with 36 manufacturing
industries.
We restrict the sample to include only full-time manufacturing workers in the age
group of 18-65 years. In the nal data set used for wage regressions there are 302,309
persons yielding 958,884 person-years. Descriptive statistics for selected individual level
variables are displayed in Table 3.
Insert table 3 here
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section we consider whether exporters are paying higher wages when worker char-
acteristics are taken account of? If so may this e¤ect be explained by a lack of control for
the skill intensity of the rm (our rst alternative hypothesis)? And is it robust to the
inclusion of an interaction term between export and skill intensity (our second alternative
hypothesis)?
4.1 Skills, exports and individual wages
The empirical strategy is to compare wages of otherwise similar workers who work in
rms with di¤erent skill intensities and export behaviour. Suppose that the hourly wage
rate of worker i in rm j at time t is determined by a simple Mincer human capital wage
equation of the form
logwijt = 
0xit + 0zjt + i + ijt; (1)
Individual covariates such as experience, experience squared and tenure are included in
xit; and rm specic variables notably variables for whether rms are exporting and the
share of workers in the rm having further education (the skill intensity) are contained
in zjt: This model is an individual xed e¤ects specication, i.e., i is a time-invariant
unobservable component of human capital such as intelligence or motivation. Thus, in
contrast to the vast literature on exporting and wages that rely on rm level data alone, we
are able to control for the fact that workers in exporting rms may have better observed
and unobserved characteristics than workers in nonexporting rms.
One important source of bias in the coe¢ cients of interest () may be unobserved
rm characteristics that are correlated with export variables or the skill intensity and
individual wages. To alleviate this problem one strategy would be to include xed e¤ects
for pairs of workers and rms. However, such a strategy is not straightforward in the
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present case because we only have four years of data. If we included worker-rm xed
e¤ects, identication would only be based on stayers and thus come from changes in export
and skill intensity in a rm over time. Over only four years such variation is minimal 
there is in particular very little within-rm variation in the skill intensity so we need
to rely also on movers to identify the e¤ects of skill intensity.7 Instead we are careful to
control for as much observed rm heterogeneity as possible. In the regressions below we
include information on capital per worker, rm size measured by the number of employees,
the share of women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the
share of the workforce with age above 40 years.
In section 2 we outlined di¤erent hypotheses concerning the export premium in wages,
and Table 4 displays estimation results related to these hypotheses. The three models in
the table are the results of running di¤erent specications of the wage equation in (1),
and in all cases we include year dummies, industry dummies and individual covariates as
reported in table 3 (coe¢ cients not reported).
Insert table 4 here
In the rst model we do not control for the skill intensity in the rm, and we do not
allow for any interactions between skill intensity and exporting. This model, therefore,
corresponds to the traditional approach in the literature on wage premia in exporting
rms. However, in contrast to this literature we control for observed and unobserved
worker heterogeneity. We nd that the decision to export or not has no impact on wages,
while the export intensity has a signicant positive impact on wages. The coe¢ cient
implies that a ten percentage point increase in the export intensity corresponds to 3.3
percent higher wages. This result is very similar to the ndings by Schank et al. (2006)
who study a German matched worker-rm dataset. They also nd no impact of the
export dummy but a positive impact of the export intensity, and in their corresponding
specication wages rise by 2.8 percent for blue collar workers and 1.5 percent for white
collar workers when the export intensity rises by ten percentage points.
In the second model, we include the share of the workers in the rm with further
education as our measure of the rm level skill intensity. First, we see that the skill inten-
sity variable has a substantial and highly signicant impact on wages (a ten percentage
points higher skill intensity corresponds to 11 percent higher wages). Second, we see that
inclusion of the skill intensity variable only slightly reduces the coe¢ cient to the export
7Schank et al. (2005) nd almost no impact on the coe¢ cient to the export intensity variables from
taking rm xed e¤ects into account. This is conrmed in the Danish data but only for the export
intensity the impact of skill intensity is washed away by the rm xed e¤ects.
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intensity variable. Thus, although exporting companies do have a much higher share of
further educated workers, and a higher share of further educated workers leads to higher
wages, the wage premium in exporting rms is not a result of a higher skill intensity in
exporting rms. That is, we can reject the rst alternative hypothesis.
In the third model, we include the interaction term between skill intensity and export
intensity. Firms may hire more high skilled workers to di¤erentiate their products to
escape competition in world markets, and this benet from the skill intensity is more
pronounced the more involved the rms are in export markets. Thus the inclusion of
the interaction term allows us to better distinguish between the competing explanations
behind the export and human capital premia. If rms learn from exporting and this is the
reason behind the positive exporting wage premium, this e¤ect should stand irrespective
of the inclusion of the interaction term. Likewise if there are important social returns
to education, the direct e¤ect of skill intensity should be una¤ected by the interaction
term. We nd that the interaction term indeed enters the wage equation with a large and
positive e¤ect. Furthermore this e¤ect absorbs the entire e¤ect of the export intensity
while the skill intensity still has a direct positive impact on wages, but its magnitude has
been reduced somewhat. Thus, we nd clear evidence in support of our second hypothesis.
An interesting extension is to allow for heterogeneity in the e¤ects across educational
subgroups of the workers. In the following we have split the sample in three groups;
unskilled workers, workers with vocational education and workers with further education,
and Table 5 shows the results.
Insert table 5 here
Qualitatively there is not much di¤erence between the subgroups, but the e¤ects seem
to be strongest for workers with vocational education. In model 1 these workers is the
only group to experience a signicantly positive e¤ect of export intensity. They also have
the highest coe¢ cient to the skill intensity in model 2, but unskilled workers and workers
with further education also gain from having co-workers with further education. In model
3 the interaction term has a signicant positive impact for all three subgroups (only at
the 10 percent level for workers with further education), and again the e¤ect is strongest
for workers with vocational education. Interestingly the direct e¤ect of skill intensity is
no longer signicant for any subgroup and the coe¢ cients are all smaller than for the
full sample. This questions the robustness of the notion of human capital spill-overs at
the rm level. Further, workers with vocational education even have a weak negative
direct e¤ect of export intensity, so perhaps the direct e¤ect of exporting may actually for
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some workers signal more competition and thus lower wages. To sum up, we nd that
the evidence we found for our second hypothesis for the full sample is not qualitatively
sensitive to heterogeneity across educational subgroups.
4.2 Endogeneity
An important question is wether we can attach any causal interpretation to the relation-
ship between exports, skill intensity and wages. Exporting may increase wages if rms
learn and become more competitive by serving foreign markets, but as argued in the in-
troduction support has been found for reverse causality in the sense that productive high
paying rms self-select into exporting. Another source of endogeneity bias is if rms face
increasing demand for their products in export markets and as a result pays higher wages
through rent sharing. At the same time the higher demand likely leads to a higher export
intensity. In this case exporting is not causing higher wages. Likewise, with respect to
the relationship between skill intensity and wages, increased demand may induce rms to
hire younger and more educated workers which would imply a higher skill intensity, but
it would be wrong to interpret this as a causal relationship from skill intensity to wages.
In this sub-section we address this issue by instrumenting the export and skill inten-
sities and the interaction term between the two variables. Of course, implementation of
instrumental variables methods calls for acceptable instruments in the sense that they are
relevant, i.e., they explain a signicant amount of variation in the endogenous regressors,
and they are valid, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equation.
As instruments for the export intensity we use the age of the rm, the export ratio of
the rms industry8 and the 10 year lagged export ratio. We argue that the age of the
rm potentially a¤ects the export intensity as rms grow over time and increasingly enter
export markets. At the same time we do not expect age to play a direct role in wage
determination. The average export ratio of the industry is likely to be correlated with
the rms export intensity but it appears not to be signicantly related with wages in
the Danish labour market, see Munch and Skaksen (2005). As instruments for the skill
intensity we try with the average skill intensity of the industry and the average skill in-
tensity of the local labour market.9 Skill intensities at more aggregated levels should be
exogenous to and correlated with the rm level skill intensity and it is not immediately
8The export ratio is dened as the industrys total export divided by industry output. The industry
denition is based on a Danish code from the National Accounts with 55 manufacturing industries.
9The local labour markets are socalled communting areas, which are dened by groups of geograph-
ically connected municipalities where the internal commuting is 50 percent higher than the external
commuting.
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clear that they should be important for wage determination given that we also include
industry xed e¤ects and regional control variables. For the interaction term we use as
instruments the six combinations of interacted instruments.
In a situation with multiple potential instruments for each potentially endogenous
variable we may test for relevance and validity of the instruments. Our strategy is as a
rst step to include all instruments implementing two-stage least squares, since this may
generate more e¢ cient estimates.10 Next we evaluate the relevance of instruments in two
ways. First, we implement the test of redundancy suggested by Hall and Peixe (2003) for
each instrument11, but we never found any signs of redundancy of any of our instruments
in any model below. Second, for the nal set of instruments we calculate the cluster-
robust F -test for excluded instruments corresponding to the "partial R-squared" measure
of instrument relevance proposed by Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). The F -statistic
rejects the null that the instruments are jointly equal to zero in all rst-stage regressions
although sometimes only at the 10 percent level in the regression for the export intensity.
Finally, with respect to the validity requirement we rst test each instrument individually
using the C-statistic by choosing a conservative signicance level of 20 percent. For
the skill intensity in the local labour market we rejected the null hypothesis that this
instrument is valid, so we dropped it along with its interaction terms. For all the remaining
valid instruments we also evaluate their overall validity using the cluster-robust version of
Sargans statistic for over-identication (the Hansen J-statistic) and it was never rejected.
Table 6 presents the estimation results for the full sample corresponding to the previous
results of Table 4. In model 1 the coe¢ cient to the export intensity almost triples, but
it is no longer signicant. In model 2 the skill intensity is added and its coe¢ cient is
slightly higher than the corresponding OLS coe¢ cient. Again it is no longer signicant,
but it is well known that 2SLS standard errors have a tendency to be large. In model 3 we
add the interaction term and the coe¢ cient to this variable more than doubles and it is
signicant at the 10 percent level. Interestingly in this case the interaction term absorbs
both direct e¤ects, such that there no longer seems to be any spillover e¤ect of education
at the rm level. We also calculate and report the cluster-robust version of the Hausman
test of endogeneity of the potentially endogenous variables in the models, and in no case
can we reject the null that the variables under consideration are exogenous. Thus, overall
10It should be noted that our potentially endogenous regressors take values in the interval [0; 1]; so in
principle the rst stage equation is a non-linear tobit. However, Angrist and Krueger (2001) argue that
two-stage least squares is a robust estimation method and that consistency of the second-stage estimates
does not depend on getting the rst-stage functional form right.
11Instruments are redundant if the asymptotic e¢ ciency of the estimation is not improved by using
them.
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the IV results do not indicate endogeneity, and, if anything, they only reinforce the OLS
results.
Insert table 6 here
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the relationship between a rms education level, export
performance and wages of its workers. We have o¤ered a brief discussion of the possible
theoretical connection. We argue that rms may escape intense competition in interna-
tional markets by using high skilled workers to undertake or improve innovation, design
or branding and thereby di¤erentiate their products. Lower product market competition,
in turn, is likely to spill over into wages if the labour market is unionised and workers and
rms bargain over rents created in the rm. That is, we should nd a positive association
between a rms share of educated labour and wages of the workers.
Using a very rich matched worker rm longitudinal dataset we rst reestablish two
separate results from the existing literature. First, controlling for observed and unobserved
worker heterogeneity, we nd that rms with high export intensities pay higher wages.
The existing literature uses rm level data and is therefore unable to control for worker
heterogeneity. We show that even after controlling for possible selection of high quality
workers into exporting rms the exporting wage premium still stands. Second, in line with
a small literature on rm-level human capital externalities, we nd that the rm level skill
intensity increases wages of all workers in the rm. This indicates that interaction with
high skilled workers at the workplace may lead to learning and higher productivity and
wages for all.
Our main result is that inclusion of an interaction term between the export intensity
and the proportion of educated workers at the rm level enters the wage equation with
a signicant positive e¤ect. In addition, this interaction term absorbs the direct e¤ect
of exporting and much of the e¤ect of rm level education. These results are consistent
with the ndings of Schott (2004) in the sense that rms may increase their use of highly
educated labour to di¤erentiate their products and thereby escape intense competition at
international markets. By doing so wages may increase as workers are in a better bar-
gaining position if there is less intensive competition at the goods market. That is, in line
with our theoretical considerations, the export wage premium accrues disproportionately
to workers in rms with high skill intensities.
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A Appendix: Tables and gures
Table 1. Manufacturing firms and exports
Year Proportion that export Proportion exported
1999 0.84 0.17
2000 0.85 0.18
2001 0.85 0.19
2002 0.88 0.18
Notes: Firms are classied as exporters if they export to countries outside EU-15 and Norway.
Proportion exported is total exports out of EU15 and Norway as a percentage of exporting
producerssales. Only manufacturing rms with more than 50 employees are included.
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Table 2. Sample means, firms 2002
Nonexporters Exporters
Exporters
Intensity > 0.1
Average size (employees) 124 247 327
Sales (1,000,000 DKK) 141 384 505
Firm age (years) 17.7 24.7 25.8
Capital per worker (1,000 DKK) 355 358 356
Share of workers unskilled 0.41 0.40 0.37
Share of workers with vocational edu. 0.45 0.44 0.42
Share of workers with further edu. 0.14 0.16 0.21
Share of workers above 40 years 0.44 0.48 0.48
Share of workers female 0.26 0.30 0.32
Share of workers member of union 0.81 0.83 0.82
Share working part-time 0.09 0.04 0.03
Average wage rate, unskilled (DKK) 158 157 159
Average wage rate, vocational (DKK) 192 183 182
Average wage rate, further (DKK) 226 242 249
Average export intensity (exports/sales) 0.13 0.30
Number of rms 164 1,085 426
Notes: Firms are classied as exporters if they export to countries outside EU-15 and Norway.
Only manufacturing rms with more than 50 employees are included.
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Table 3. Summary statistics, workers
Mean Min. Max.
Log wage rate (DKK) 5.17 3.74 6.73
Age 18-24 0.06 0 1
Age 25-29 0.10 0 1
Age 30-39 0.33 0 1
Age 40-49 0.27 0 1
Age 50-59 0.22 0 1
Age 60-65 0.02 0 1
Female 0.31 0 1
Married 0.59 0 1
Two adults 0.75 0 1
Kids 0-6 years 0.23 0 1
Immigrant 0.04 0 1
Copenhagen 0.11 0 1
Big city 0.13 0 1
Small city 0.76 0 1
Unskilled 0.38 0 1
Vocational education 0.44 0 1
Further education 0.18 0 1
Experience (years) 18.11 0 39
Experience squared 418.83 0 1521
Tenure (years) 5.92 0 22
Union membership 0.89 0 1
UI fund membership 0.94 0 1
Number of observations 958,884
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Table 4. Effects of export and skill intensities on wages
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coe¤. std.err. coe¤. std.err. coe¤. std.err.
Export dummy -0.0009 0.0035 -0.0014 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0035
Export intensity 0.0327 0.0102 0.0274 0.0101 -0.0171 0.0153
Skill intensity 0.1080 0.0191 0.0711 0.0205
Exp. int.  skill int. 0.2146 0.0562
Number of observations 958,884 958,884 958,884
R2 0.8813 0.8814 0.8814
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the rm level. Bold numbers indicate
a signicant e¤ect at the 5 percent level. Only workers in rms with more than 50
employees are included. Individual level variables (see Table 3), individual xed e¤ects,
industry e¤ects, year e¤ects and rm level variables (capital per worker, log of rm size,
the share of women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the
share of the workforce with age above 40 years) are included in all models.
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Table 5. Estimation results for educational subgroups
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coe¤. std.err. coe¤. std.err. coe¤. std.err.
Unskilled workers:
Export dummy -0.0001 0.0039 -0.0008 0.0038 -0.0002 0.0039
Export intensity 0.0252 0.0155 0.0221 0.0154 -0.0116 0.0218
Skill intensity 0.0588 0.0326 0.0229 0.0342
Exp. int.  skill int. 0.2037 0.0811
Number of observations 365,097 365,097 365,097
R2 0.8902 0.8902 0.8902
Workers with vocational education:
Export dummy -0.0023 0.0041 -0.0026 0.0040 -0.0014 0.0041
Export intensity 0.0386 0.0132 0.0356 0.0131 -0.0309 0.0172
Skill intensity 0.0709 0.0217 0.0125 0.0257
Exp. int.  skill int. 0.3433 0.0903
Number of observations 420,475 420,475 420,475
R2 0.8686 0.8687 0.8688
Workers with further education:
Export dummy 0.0025 0.0048 0.0026 0.0049 0.0031 0.0049
Export intensity 0.0162 0.0103 0.0144 0.0104 -0.0223 0.0202
Skill intensity 0.0532 0.0227 0.0309 0.0268
Exp. int.  skill int. 0.1258 0.0658
Number of observations 173,312 173,312 173,312
R2 0.9280 0.9280 0.9281
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the rm level. Bold numbers indicate
a signicant e¤ect at the 5 percent level, and numbers in italics indicate a signicant
e¤ect at the 10 percent level. Only workers in rms with more than 50 employees are
included. Individual level variables (see Table 3), individual xed e¤ects, industry e¤ects,
year e¤ects and rm level variables (capital per worker, log of rm size, the share of
women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the share of the
workforce with age above 40 years) are included in all models.
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Table 6. Effects of export and skill intensities on wages, 2SLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coe¤. std.err. coe¤. std.err. coe¤. std.err.
Export dummy -0.0025 0.0043 -0.0025 0.0042 0.0005 0.0048
Export intensity 0.0937 0.1297 0.0676 0.1311 -0.0506 0.1604
Skill intensity 0.1197 0.0801 -0.0017 0.1022
Exp. int.  skill int. 0.5023 0.3279
p-value of endog. test 0.8210 0.9575 0.4247
Number of observations 958,884 958,884 958,884
R2 (within) 0.1885 0.1899 0.1899
Notes: Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the rm level. Numbers in italics indicate
a signicant e¤ect at the 10 percent level. Only workers in rms with more than 50
employees are included. Individual level variables (see Table 3), individual xed e¤ects,
industry e¤ects, year e¤ects and rm level variables (capital per worker, log of rm size,
the share of women, the share of union members, the share of part time workers and the
share of the workforce with age above 40 years) are included in all models.
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